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Abstract
Across the Air Force, Airmen agree that Information Operations (IO) is a topic worthy of our attention, but few Airmen can agree on exactly what IO is. The primary source of this confusion traces back to the very label we are using. The word information in its name implies a direct and exclusive relationship between IO and Information Superiority as well as the Information Domain. Another contributing factor is the persistent confusion between influence capabilities, provided by IO, and influence effects, the essence of all warfare. In the end, reliance on information as the common denominator for this set of capabilities eventually led to IO tribalism within the Air Force and an inefficient "everything is IO" mindset.
If Air Force IO is going to provide relevant and useful engagement options to commanders, it must bring specific capabilities to the fight not already clearly defined in our air warfare, space operations, or mobility doctrine. The Air Force made significant progress by streamlining its version of IO in January 2005, but still did not clearly define a replacement for information as the entrance qualifier for IO doctrine. Without a common "glue" to bind these capabilities, IO is simply a conglomeration of unrelated and otherwise orphaned mission areas.
This research paper examines IO concept development over the last decade and investigates some of the problems resulting from recent Air Force IO terminology and doctrine.
Introduction 1
The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance than the bodies of his troops.
-Mao Tse-Tung
What are Information Operations and how do you achieve Information Superiority? On one hand, IO still does not receive sufficient attention and confidence from Air Force planners to stand on equal ground with more traditional kinetic capabilities. The air war over Kosovo demonstrates that IO is often an after-thought in the air component's planning process.
Although planning for Operation ALLIED FORCE began nine months before the start of the conflict on 24 March 1999, Secretary of Defense William Cohen testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee "the conduct of an integrated information operations campaign was delayed by the lack of both advanced planning and strategic guidance defining key objectives."
This clearly implies that IO was not an important part of initial campaign planning. 1 On the other hand, much of the prevalent hype in recent staff briefings across the Air Force suggests that IO is a military panacea incorporating a disparate collection of capabilities. This research paper examines the problems associated with recent Air Force IO terminology and doctrine, and promulgates a vision for Air Force IO focused on the seamless integration of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. The methodology for this examination begins with contextual and literal definitions of IO, and then looks at how this mission area has developed over the last decade, followed by the conceptual deconstruction that led to the current doctrinal construct. The paper will culminate with a modified vision for Air Force IO and a proposal to label this set of capabilities "Non-Kinetic Operations", further suggesting that the "IO" we should concern ourselves with is actually "Integrated Operations". we must first understand the terminology involved. This paper will address these questions by examining the differing service perspectives, the domains in which they operate, and finally the terminology of IO itself.
Defining Information Operations
Complicated by Tribal Perspectives
The first problem with defining Information Operations is the differing opinions of what military actions actually comprise it. Joint Publication 3-13 offers a joint definition for IO based on strategies and capabilities to affect information and information systems. 5 However, each service branch has tailored its own version of IO to best suit their parochial needs. The Army focuses on employing IO as an element of combat power to achieve information superiority at decisive points in an operation, in order to support the commander in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. 6 This translates to heavy emphasis on Army IO elements such as on the battlefield and decide how to act on it. 12 As paraphrased from Mao TseTung's writings, the mind of the enemy commander, his cognitive processes, are the principle military target.
However, we cannot directly target the cognitive domain and change an enemy's mind for him.
We can only change the environment in which he exists.
The information domain provides the connection between the physical and cognitive domains. All activities in the physical domain create effects in the cognitive domain, provided someone senses the activity. This brings to mind the classic dilemma, "If a tree falls in the forest and nobody is around to hear it, does it make a sound?" Information provides a cognitive lens to the physical domains. In a military context, the information domain is the medium though which we can change the enemy's perceptions of the battlefield, disorient him, and influence him to make decisions in our favor. Of course, a thinking, reacting adversary will attempt to do the same to us. This mutual desire to create effects in the cognitive domain through manipulation of the information domain suggests that information itself is a weapon as well as a target.
This realization regarding the information domain formed the basis of the Air Force's understanding of IO through 2004. This concept centered on a strategy to attack and defend information and information systems, with any physical or information-based capability available. 13 However, this IO definition was more of a strategy than a specific set of capabilities.
In effects based operations, commanders are principally concerned with the production of desired effects, not as much on the platforms or capabilities used to create them. Military force providers should offer a broad range of solutions to commanders. IO can offer viable capabilities to target the message as well as the means of information flow. However, commanders may also use kinetic capabilities to target key information systems in the physical domain, like communications nodes and control centers, to create the same effects by disrupting or reshaping messages within the information domain. Therefore, despite the implications of its label, Information Operations is not the exclusive means to affect the information domain. In this case, the terminology associated with IO has been its biggest source of confusion.
Struggling with Terminology
Another obstacle towards understanding the definition of IO is the very label assigned to it. Whether we should call this doctrinal area Information Operations or Information Warfare is a subject of periodic debate. Do we conduct operations in peacetime and warfare in conflict?
Perhaps operations are a subset of warfare, or vice versa. Joint Publication 1-02 defines operation as "a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission." 14 While this meaning for operation encompasses the entire spectrum of conflict, the term warfare is limited to "the waging of war." Therefore, the term warfare is inherent to operations and not the other way around. Because it does not address the full spectrum of conflict, there is no value added by use of the term "Information Warfare". For the purposes of this research paper, further references to "Information
Operations" shall infer military actions within the subject doctrinal area during peace, transition, and war.
Information Superiority, like air superiority, is a critical element of successful joint operations. The question is, "Do successfully executed Information Operations achieve Information Superiority?" The answer is, "Yes, but not alone." The Air Force currently defines Information Superiority as "the degree of dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition." 15 As previously discussed, we can create information effects using kinetic or nonkinetic capabilities. Therefore, IO is an inclusive, not exclusive, contributor to the achievement of Information Superiority.
Certainly, across the spectrum of conflict, information itself is a constant object of military pursuit as well as a lucrative target vulnerable to attack. Clausewitz regarded the role of information and knowledge in warfare as "a factor more vital than any other." 16 The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines information as "knowledge derived from study, experience, or instruction." For comparison, Joint Publication 1-02 defines information as "facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form." 17 By either definition, information is pervasive throughout all aspects of military operations including surveillance, targeting, engagement, assessment, mobility, administration, logistics, and command and control. To some degree, every military activity is dependent on the interpretation and dissemination of information. Therefore, use of the term information in the label for this set of capabilities implies that "everything is an Information Operation." Of course, when referring to IO, we did not intend for this paradox to result. However, words do have meaning and we should consider adjusting the terminology to accurately reflect our meaning.
IO is also not as simple as "operating with information". If so, placing a phone call to order a pizza, sending an email to a friend, or even writing this paper would qualify as an Information Operation. These activities are merely things we do while operating in the information age. While PSYOPS, EW, and network defense may qualify as "operations", the use of the word "information" misrepresents the nature and limits the utility of these capabilities.
Even worse, it encourages an "everything is IO" mentality. Therefore, the label "Information
Operations" may be one of the biggest misnomers in our modern military lexicon.
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In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
-Sun Tzu Circa 500 B.C. Consider the invention of the rifled musket and minnie ball just before the U.S. Civil War.
Despite effective ranges of hundreds of yards, both sides continued to fight using Napoleonic formally recognized IO as a potential revolution of military affairs. They defined information as a separate realm, independent from the physical domains of air, land, sea, and space. They pointed to information as a potential weapon as well as a lucrative target. While this was a crucial first step in officially defining this emerging mission area, it also established a mindset that would prove difficult to overcome over the next decade. In the mid-1990s, this Air Force publication defined Information Operations as "any action (emphasis added) involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or transformation of information that enhances the employment of military forces." 22 In the mid-1990s, this idea firmly planted the idea that "everything is IO" into the Airman's mindset. 
Tearing Down IO Stovepipes
Adherence to dogmas has destroyed more armies and cost more battles than anything in war.
-J.F.C. Fuller
Many people erroneously refer to IO as if it were a standalone capability. IO is merely a label to describe a unique collection of capabilities offering potential military solutions to commanders. Across the joint community, we already have doctrine associated with military operations in the physical domains of air, space, land, and maritime. Special Operations doctrine spans many of these domains, but we do not want to treat IO as "special". Instead, we must normalize IO by refining our doctrine and concepts of operation in such a way that our people can understand it, our force providers can posture it, and our commanders have the confidence to employ it.
Air Force Basic Doctrine, entitled AFDD 1, calls for Airmen to focus on integration, not just synchronization. 27 This means we cannot be satisfied with the mere deconfliction of joint forces, as was the case with route packages in Vietnam, for example. 28 Integration, by comparison, is "the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole." 29 To be meaningful in this jointly integrated context, Air
Force IO cannot be the panacea espoused in previous Air Force doctrine. IO must provide specific, unique, and useful capabilities to the JFC. With this in mind, we can start taking apart the 2002 Air Force IO model and see if we can put it back together in a more operationally relevant construct. Be warned, just like taking apart an engine in your garage, there might be extra parts at the end that just do not seem to fit into the rebuilt version.
Why did Airmen believe in the previous "everything is IO" construct? The answer is simple, "it was in our doctrine." Therefore, the first step is to subject Air Force IO doctrine to a weight loss program of sorts.
The "Less is More" Approach to Information Operations
As previously discussed, both IIW and ISvs are vital to all Air Force operations, and therefore neither is exclusive to IO. We must "Gain and Exploit" adversary information to successfully employ any military "Attack and Defend" capability. 
Capabilities and Effects
We have made substantial progress in transitioning from metrics-based operations to effects-based operations. However, the Air Force itself, as a military service, does not produce direct combat effects. Instead, we organize, train, and equip capabilities and grow leaders who know how to employ them. We then provide both of these as combat potential to the Unified Combatant Commands. This combat potential might be iron on the ramp provided as Air Expeditionary Task Forces, or reachback forces that can produce and support combat effects from the Continental United States. Of course, all of these forces include Airmen doing what the Air Force has trained and equipped them to do, but now they produce combat effects, typically under the operational control of a JFC. 36 The power of the Joint Force stems not only from the high-tech nature of our weapon systems and the tireless training we give our servicemen and women, but also from the broad range of capabilities combatant commanders have at their disposal to solve real military problems. Certainly, Information Operations puts some of these arrows into the commander's quiver of options. However, physical attack in the form of "hard-kill" or kinetic weapons may also to contribute to the desired influence effects. This does not mean physical attack, a B-52 strike for example, is an influence capability, nor does it mean we should doctrinally compartmentalize physical attack under Information Operations. More specifically, we must recognize the difference between influence capabilities, like PSYOPS and Military Deception, and influence effects, which are the essence of all warfare.
The Essence of Warfare
Military forces have employed some form of Information Operations since the dawn of human conflict. As early as 500 B.C., Sun Tzu wrote, "All warfare is based on deception." 37 At the heart of all warfare is the desire for one group to influence another group. Conflict between nations could be about land, power, trade, ethnic or religious differences, but the desired effect is always about influencing the other side to capitulate in some way. The stated goal of Operation LINEBACKER II was to influence the North Vietnamese to return to the negotiation table. In
Operation DESERT STORM, we sought to influence the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Finally, a primary objective in our Global War on Terrorism is to influence peaceful nations, even weak and failing states that may need our assistance, to deny terrorist organizations the breeding ground they need to expand their networks. Because "everything really is for influence effect" and IO includes many obvious influence capabilities, the "everything is IO" trap threatens to ensnare us again.
As a military service, the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips influence "capabilities" that commanders may employ to achieve influence "effects". However, kinetic capabilities like close air support and air interdiction are air operations that may also contribute to the desired influence "effect". Some have argued the B-52 is a psychological weapon because we used it to influence Iraqi forces to surrender in 1991 during Operation DESERT STORM. Although catchy, this statement is doctrinally flawed. This is the same as concluding, "A screwdriver is a heating capability because friction warms the screw as it is turned." The screwdriver simply provides the capability to turn a screw. Second order effects, like heat generated by friction, can be either inconsequential or a desirable and useful byproduct of the employed capability.
In Operation DESERT STORM, we used specific influence capabilities such as PA and PSYOPS to educate Iraqi citizens and soldiers about the power of American bombers and our intent to use them. Well-timed B-52 strikes near Republican Guard armored columns added significant credibility to these influence capabilities and produced an integrated effect more substantial than either separate capability might have generated. In similar fashion, potential adversaries respect American airpower thanks to the application of influence capabilities around the world. This speaks to the power of operational integration to produce desired effects and achieve commander's intent. It is no accident that "Integrating Operations" is one of our three Air Force core competencies. 38 Influence is the essence of all warfare. IO provides dedicated "influence capabilities" to commanders, but they are not restricted to these "influence capabilities" in order to produce the necessary "influence effects". The commander can choose numerous paths to get to the same result. Factors like collateral damage, political impact, operational risk, speed, cost, and security may help the commander select the right combination of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities for employment. Therefore, although victory in warfare may require achievement of certain "influence effects", we can conclude that not everything is an Influence Operation. If Air Force IO is going to provide relevant and useful engagement options to commanders, it must bring specific capabilities to the fight not already clearly defined in our air warfare, space operations, or mobility doctrine. In other words, we must define the unique qualifier that defines entry into the Air Force IO doctrine. As argued in this paper, our experience over the last ten years has already demonstrated the trap resulting from simply relying on the word "information" as this qualifier. At the same time, Information Operations should not end up the final resting place for capabilities that just did not fit in other, more mature, mission areas. We must define the glue that binds this set of capabilities.
Recommending a New Vision for USAF Information Operations
Relevance for IO is contingent on the needs of the JFC. Stovepiped capabilities that do not integrate well with other joint capabilities are not useful in joint effects-based operations.
The commander must integrate a broad range of military disciplines so that the total military potential at his fingertips is greater than the sum of its parts if employed in a "disjointed"
manner. This entails a focus on effects, independent of platforms and parochialism. In selecting specific capabilities to produce desired effects, planners will consider elements of the operational art, the principles of war, the principles of MOOTW, and factors like collateral damage, and the Law of Armed Conflict. 39 Under pressure, a JFC will tend to select capabilities based on confidence acquired in testing and training. This will require us to treat IO capabilities like weapon systems by applying standards for testing, evaluation, training, and technology. In the end, IO must be a specific set of capabilities that we could integrate with other joint capabilities to produce effects based operations in support of the JFC. Furthermore, joint planners could feasibly integrate any of these capabilities into the JFC's campaign. These capabilities each carry unique collateral damage and targeting considerations, essentially allowing IO capabilities to bypass traditional fielded forces to affect an adversary's vulnerable centers of gravity. It seems the latest version of AFDD 2-5 finally provides a relevant model for Air Force IO by using a "less-is-more" approach for inclusion of capabilities.
However, this latest version of AFDD 2-5 still does not clearly define the glue that unifies these capabilities under the IO umbrella. It does concede, "IO provides predominantly non-kinetic capabilities to the warfighter." 41 Use of the word predominately in this statement was clearly a compromise, begging the question, "Which of these IO capabilities are then kinetic by nature?"
Making the Case for Non-Kinetic Operations
Influence Operations are intuitively non-kinetic. PSYOPS, Military Deception, and PA Operations all target the cognitive domain to influence an adversary or inform a global audience.
Some may argue that the distribution of leaflets, dropped by fighter aircraft in converted bomb casings, qualifies as a kinetic capability. This is muddled thinking. Indeed, the bomb casing and even the leaflet itself is technically mass in motion. However, the bomb casing, paper, and aircraft constitute delivery platforms, not capabilities. The capabilities provided by Influence
Operations are ways of influencing decisions, behaviors, perceptions, or attitudes of a target audience 'non-kinetically', using PSYOPS, Military Deception, and PA Operations.
Electronic Warfare advocates may argue that towed-decoys, chaff, and flares are kinetic 'capabilities'. This is not true. Again, they are indeed kinetic 'platforms', again involving mass in motion. The capability these EW platforms provide involves the manipulation of radar waveforms to produce false targets on an adversary's radar screen; this is clearly a non-kinetic capability. Some may also contest that EW is kinetic when it comes to employment of the Highspeed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM). Although extremely EW dependent, HARM is not EW.
It is one of many platforms supporting Offensive Counter Air capabilities. The Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) is the perfect cross-doctrinal case for operational integration. Our
Air Warfare doctrine provides Lethal SEAD through employment of physical attack, including HARM or iron bombs, while EW provides Non-Lethal SEAD through employment of electromagnetic attack. 42 Synergistically employed, Lethal and Non-Lethal SEAD constitute a range of options to neutralize, destroy or disrupt enemy air defenses.
The kinetic debate "heats up" even more in regards to the use of lasers and high-power microwave, both of which fall under the common definition of EW. 43 According to the American Heritage Dictionary, laser is actually an acronym standing for "L(ight) A(mplification by) S(timulated) E(mission of) R(adiation)." Additionally, microwave is "electromagnetic radiation between infrared and shortwave radio wavelengths." Although lasers and microwaves can heat up conductive targets to the point of rupture or explosion, their electromagnetic nature implies they are non-kinetic. If the laser or microwave is used to affect an adversary's use of the electromagnetic spectrum, or protect our ability to do so, then it is indeed a non-kinetic capability under EW. However, if it is used to blow up ballistics missiles for example, it is a Defensive Counter Air capability conducting Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. The capability, not the platform, determines whether it is kinetic or non-kinetic in nature.
Conceptually speaking, Network Warfare advocates may argue the ability to burn up a hostile computer system is a kinetic capability. This is also not true either. A notional 'cyber'-capability to remotely shut off a computer's cooling fan or send a hard drive into catastrophic failure is a matter of electronic signals sent across data networks. As second or third order effects, these capabilities could destroy a motherboard, the entire computer, or even the adversary building that housed the computer. However, based on the means used to achieve the first order effect, it is clear that the capability itself is strictly non-kinetic by nature. Operations, and Special Operations as chapters in the family of Air Force Doctrine ( Figure 4) .
As is the case with Air Superiority, all of these operations may collectively contribute to Information Superiority. 
Conclusion
We thought we were introducing into the world an invention which would make further wars practically impossible…
In a research paper on Air Force Information Operations, the quote above seems very applicable to the potential utility of Information Operations as a surrogate for conventional war. Conjuring visions of hacker versus hacker in a cyber struggle for global dominance, Information Operations seems to offer the promise of a bloodless means for future nation-states to resolve their conflicts. As is the case with Information
Operations, this quote captures the American tendency to over-hype certain new technologies as the next revolution in military affairs. However, this quote is over 90 years old, and had nothing to do with Information Operations.
(continued)… Nevertheless, the world finds itself in the greatest war in history. Neither side has been able to win on account of the part the aeroplane has played.
-Orville Wright 17 June 1917
Despite the early thoughts of the Wright brothers, or the dark predictions of Giulio Douhet, air warfare did not make land or maritime warfare obsolete. Given the evidence provided by two world wars and countless regional conflicts, the invention of the airplane certainly did not make war in the 20 th Century impossible. However, the integration of airpower did significantly transform the way nations have fought every war since its invention. The same is undoubtedly true for the future of Information Operations.
Since the mid 1990's, the Air Force has aggressively pursued an understanding of how Operations, the Air Force no longer relies on "information" as the entrance qualifier for the concept. We finally identify IO as a set of capabilities, spawned out the Information Age, which is unique and specific enough to be useful as a member in the family of Air Force Doctrine.
While supportable, this new doctrinal approach still does not specifically define the binding characteristic that defines Information Operations. Without a common "glue" to define this set of capabilities, IO is simply a conglomeration of unrelated and otherwise orphaned mission areas. However, there is a common denominator between EW, Influence Operations, and Network Warfare Operations. All three provide non-kinetic capabilities by their very nature, but possess the capacity to create lethal, non-lethal, or even kinetic effects in the battlespace.
Therefore, the Air Force should replace the misnomer "Information Operations" with the title "Non-Kinetic Operations" to capture the capabilities involved more accurately.
Our ultimate goal is to seamlessly integrate kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to present the Joint Force Commander with a wide range of legitimate options to solve real military problems. Discarding the outdated label Information Operations in favor of Non-Kinetic
Operations is more than just a name-change. Not only does it drop the baggage associated with the word information, it also recognizes the relevance of integrating meaningful non-kinetic capabilities into the joint fight and allows us to turn our attention to some of the more difficult challenges for this mission area including over-classification and force development issues.
Meanwhile, with these proposed adjustments to the January 2005 release of AFDD 2-5, the Air Force will finally have its non-kinetic cursor on target.
